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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE ZEESE and EMILY
ZEESE, his wife,
piaintiffs.AppeUantSi
vs.
ESTATE OF MAX SIEGEL; DAN
SIEGEL, EVA SIEGEL, and WESLEY 1
D. WEBB, a partnership d/b/a Pat- \
ton's Travelers; TRAILER MART, /
INC., a Nevada corporation, d/b/a
Dan's Campers N' Trailers; and
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELAWARE, a Delaware corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
!3870

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a quiet title and unlawful detainer action
brought by plaintiffs to remove defendant Trailer Mart,
Inc., from certain premises and for damages in unlawful
detainer against all defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon defendants' motion at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice as
to all defendants.
I
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RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Defendants seek an affirmance of the trial court's
judgment in all respects. In the alternative, if the case is
remanded to the lower court, defendants request that this
Court order further proceedings to determine the lawfulness of plaintiffs' notices to quit.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts completely disregards
the trial court's findings and is pervaded with contentious
conclusions. Defendants are, accordingly, constrained to
restate the facts in their entirety.
By a letter dated June 15, 1973 (a carbon copy of
which was sent to Dan Siegel as President of Trailer Mart,
Inc.), (Ex. 11-P), Plaintiffs George and Emily Zeese informed Eva Siegel, as Executrix of the estate of Max
Siegel, that as landlords they elected to terminate a
"month-to-month" tenancy by which Trailer Mart, Inc.,
a Siegel family corporation, possessed certain real property located as 6210 South State Street, Murray, Utah. 1
x
The status of the various parties named in the complaint should be
explained. Plaintiff George Zeese conveyed his interest in the property
in question to his wife, Emily, by a warranty deed dated August 14, 1961
(Ex. 2-P), but his testimony established, and the trial court found, that
he has always acted as his wife's agent (R. 438; Finding of Fact No. 1,
R. 64).
The court found, too, that defendants Eva and Dan Siegel, and
Wesley D. Webb, are not and never have been a partnership doing business as Patton's Travelers (Finding No. 4, R. 65). Rather, "Patton's Travelers" is the assumed name under which Trailer Mart, Inc., is now doing
business on the property in question (Finding No. 5, R. 65). The d/b/a
was changed from Dan's Campers N* Trailers to Patton's Travelers in
January, 1973 (Finding No. 15, R. 66).
Throughout this brief, unless otherwise indicated, "defendant" will
mean defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., which the trial court ruled owns the
leasehold interest in dispute.

2
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The letter explained that, "by allowing Trailer Mart, Inc.,
to use the premises as a trailer sales park," restrictive use
covenants contained in "the expired lease" had been violated. The letter concludes with notice that summary
proceedings would be commenced unless the premises were
vacated by July 18, 1973.
As will be developed in the paragraphs following,
this was the first notice that Mrs. Siegel or Dan Siegel
or any officer or agent of Trailer Mart, Inc., had ever
received that the corporation's use of the premises was
thought to violate covenants in the lease. Trailer Mart,
Inc., had used the premises for recreational vehicle sales
for four years in reliance on the lease and had assumed
all the obligations of the lessee defined therein, including
payment of property taxes and the faithful payment of
rents. It had also made valuable improvements in the
property and had informed George Zeese on numerous
occasions that it believed and acted on the belief that it
owned a leasehold interest until 1979, with the right to
exercise options to renew contained in the lease. Mrs.
Siegel, as Executrix named in the Last Will and Testament of her deceased husband, had exercised such an option approximately 46 days after the leasehold interest
had been acquired by an assignment from defendant
Husky Oil Company. Not once in the four years and two
months intervening between the assignment and the notice
to vacate had the plaintiff landlords questioned the validity of the exercise of the option or the use of the premises.
Plaintiff Emily Zeese is the owner in fee of the disputed property (Ex. 2-P). On October 28, 1959, she and

3
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plaintiff George Zeese, who then owned an interest in
the property as a joint tenant with his wife, executed a
lease agreement with Saturn Oil Company granting Saturn
a ten-year leasehold interest in the land with options to
renew for the same period at the expiration of the first
and two subsequent terms (Ex. 3-P). Saturn Oil erected
and operated a gasoline station on the premises until
March 8, 1965, when it assigned the lease to J. L. Terborg
& Company (Ex. 4-P). J. L. Terborg continued the filling
station operation until June 1, 1968, when it assigned
the lease to defendant Husky Oil Company of Delaware
(Ex. 5-P) which continued the same business until it in
turn assigned the lease to Max Siegel on May 1, 1969
(Ex.6-P).
Max Siegel died on June 3, 1969 (R-358). As soon
as the lease was assigned to him, however, he caused the
business operations of a family corporation, Trailer Mart,
Inc., which had been operating on adjacent property, to
be expanded onto the Zeese property (R. 544). At this
time Max Siegel was the President of Trailer Mart (R.
541), and it is evident that he negotiated the assignment
in this capacity for the corporation's use and benefit (R.
531, 544-48), and for the particular use and purpose of
expanding the camper and recreational vehicle sales business from the adjacent property (R. 547). And, while
the formal assignment from Husky Oil was made to "Max
Siegel, an individual," Trailer Mart, Inc., took immediate
possession of the premises and immediately began to display and sell campers and other recreational vehicles on
it (R. 549-50). The plaintiffs had prompt notice of this
assignment and occupancy by a letter from Mr. Siegel's

4
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attorneys dated May 8, 1969 (Ex. 7-P) (set out at page 8
of Brief of Appellants) which makes explicitly clear that
Trailer Mart, Inc., would be doing business on the premises as Dan's Campers N ' Trailers.
Moreover, Mr. Zeese himself testified that he knew
of the use of the premises by Trailer Mart, Inc., immediately after May 1, 1969, by his inspection of the premises
(R.448).
After Max Siegel's death, his widow, Eva Siegel, by
letter dated June 16, 1969 (Ex. 8-P), informed the Zeeses
that as Executrix named in the will of her husband, she
was exercising the option to renew the lease for another
ten-year term. Dan Siegel, her son, testified at trial that
this letter was one of numerous acts intended to *'cover
a lot of loose ends" remaining after his father's death
(R. 560). Letters Testamentary had not been issued when
the option was exercised.
Plaintiffs base their complaint and this appeal on
the contentions, essentially, (1) that Trailer Mart's use
of the premises violates use covenants in the lease, and
(2) that the option to renew was never validly exercised.
The evidence is clear that the corporation has used the
premises for camper and recreational vehicle sales since
early May, 1969, and that the option was exercised in
mid-June, 1969. One might then have expected the drama
of this lawsuit to begin unfolding in the fall of that year,
or, perhaps, with a reasonable allowance for time to survey the situation and test positions, in the winter of 1970.

5
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In fact, no objection to the use of the premises or
the exercise of the option was heard by any of the defendants (R. 476, 556-557) until June, 1973, when Eva
Siegel received the notice to vacate the premises. Mr.
Geldzahler's letter of May 8, 1969, concerning the use of
the premises went unanswered (R. 474, 556-557). Mrs.
Siegel's letter of June 16, 1969, exercising the option, received no reply (R. 476, 557). Mr. Zeese visited the premises and observed the Trailer Mart business activities at
various times after he received these letters (R. 448,
486-487). A reasonable inference must be that he observed the improvements on the premises, including the
paving of its surface and the erection of signs advertising
the business (R. 561 ).2 Mr. Zeese knew also that, as a
result of his urging, Trailer Mart had the property surveyed and a fence erected along its south boundary, and
that Trailer Mart, Inc., paid for both the survey and the
fence (R. 486-487). In short, it was manifestly clear to
Mr. Zeese, a businessman of no mean talents himself,3
that Trailer Mart was operating a substantial business
on the premises, with all of the long-term planning and
commitments such a business implies (R. 558).
2
Dan Siegel testified to other improvements which Mr. Zeese could
have noticed:
"Q. 71? 72. Were there any other improvements made on the
property?
A. We remodeled the little gas station house so it could be used
as an office. We refurbished and repainted the billboard signs so
that they would — would reflect some advertising for the camper
lot. It was about a cost of around five hundred dollars as I recall
and we repainted the main sign downstairs."
3
Mr. Zeese represented himself to be the business agent of his wife,
and both he and Dan Siegel testified to the extensive negotiations he conducted concerning the sale of the property. He was also active in the
activities directed at developing the disputed property and the property
around it. (R. 453, 455, 484).
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Mr. Zeese knew also that Dan Siegel believed he
controlled a valid, enforceable lease on the premises (R.
484, 492). From 1971 through 1973, in a series of buysell negotiations, Dan Siegel listened to Mr. Zeese's offers to sell and made offers to buy the premises, together
with the larger parcel of which it formed a part (R.
557-559). Mr. Siegel made an offer to buy based on an
appraisal that discounted the value of Mrs. Zeese's estate
in fee by the value of the leasehold interest (R. 512). This
appraisal and valuation were discussed between them
(R. 512). The record also indicates that on numerous
other occasions Mr. Siegel informed Mr. Zeese of his
belief that the value of the lease must be considered in
arriving at a price (R. 492). At no time did Mr. Zeese
contradict Mr. Siegel's directly stated position that he
controlled a valid, enforceable lease in the premises (R.
553,475).
At trial, plaintiff Zeese explained his reasons for
waiting to disabuse Mr. Siegel of his position concerning the lease:
"Q. During these negotiations over the sale of
the property in 1972, you didn't tell Mr. Siegel
that there was — that you thought that the lease
was invalid, did you?
A.

No.

Q. During the negotiations in 1973, I assume
the same is true that you didn't tell Mr. Siegel
that you thought he had an invalid lease?
A. I didn't tell him that. I want him to stay
there month-to-month until I be ready to tell him
to get out.

7
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Q.

So — but you didn't tell him that?

A. I didn't tell him that. I didn't want — he
was playing his game and I was playing mine.
Try to tell him to get out when I will be ready.
Q. So that you were going to wait until your
own convenience in order to ask — in order to
declare the lease void, is that correct?
A.

That's right." (R. 484-485)

He also explained why Mrs. Siegel's letter exercising the
option went unanswered:
"Q. Now, upon receipt of that document you did
understand that to mean that it was an exercise
of the option on the property to extend the term
another ten years?
A. I understand they want to exercise the option but I refuse because they be — Max Siegel
Estate been violating that lease all the time.
Q,

Well, tell me how you refused, Mr. Zeese.

A.

How I refuse?

Q. Yes. How did you refuse upon — after receipt of this letter, did you contact the author —
authoress of that letter, Eva Siegel, and tell her
you refused to accept it?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Did you contact Dan Siegel?

A.
to.

I didn't contact anybody because I didn't have

Q. Now, so that upon receipt of this option,
what you did is just simply didn't do anything?
A.

That's right.
8
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Q. Did it occur to you at that time that those
people might have thought they had exercised an
option?
A. There was no lease to exercise an option.
Q. But you hadn't prior to that told them that
there was no lease?
A. I didn't have to tell them because they are
not fools. They know themselves they were not
having — not getting the lease." (R. 476)
In short, plaintiffs' position from May, 1969, was
that the lease had been breached when the filling station
operations were terminated and Trailer Mart, Inc., began selling campers on the premises (R. 448). From that
time on, Mr. Zeese testified, he considered that Trailer
Mart, Inc., held the premises pursuant to a month-tomonth tenancy:
"Q. Now, you considered then that there had
been a breach of the lease on May 1 when the lease
was assigned for use as a trailer park — trailer
park — trailer sales lot?
A. I told you that I didn't tell them anything
because I had my plan. They thought they have
a lease. They try to sell that to me to convince
me that they have a lease but I know very well
and they know themselves they didn't have no
lease. They violate that lease several times.
Q. Now, between May 1 of 1969 and June of
1973 when this notice — I believe it was June 16th
of 1973 when you caused Mr. Theodore to send
a notice to quit. At that time during that four
years did you contact Dan Siegel and tell him that
he couldn't sell trailers or that it was in violation
of the lease on those premises?
A.

No, I didn't. I didn't have to.
9
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Q. Did you contact Eva Siegel?
A. No.
Q.

Did you contact Wes Webb?

A. No.
Q. Did you contact anyone at all?
A. No." (R. 475)
Nor did it ever matter to him, once he formed the opinion
the lease was breached, who occupied the premises:
"Q. Now, upon receipt of that letter in May,
1969, to the best of your recollection, Mr. Zeese,
didn't you think then that Trailer Mart, Inc., was
going to be then selling trailers on your property?
A. If they do that they know they violate the
lease. They can do as they please, but I didn't
know that, no. I know that they was on Jensen's
property selling that.
Q. But you did know that trailer sales were being conducted on the property around the first
part of May?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that and then you receive a letter
on May 8, 1969, that indicates that Max Siegel and
Trailer Mart, Inc., are going to be doing business
or as it says: 'Moreover, both Mr. Siegel and
Trailer Mart, Inc., have committed themselves to
a significant advertising program based upon the
thus expanded sales facilities.' Now, did that suggest to you that Trailer Mart, Inc., would be doing business on your property?
A. I don't care who was doing business there.
I know they didn't have no lease and I don't care."
(R. 473-474)
10
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In July, 1973, Mr. Zeese caused 15 day notices to
quit to be served upon Eva Siegel, as the Executrix of
Siegel's estate, upon Trailer Mart, Inc., and upon defendant Husky Oil Company. 4 N o one at Trailer Mart nor
any member of the Siegel family had ever been previously
informed that the premises were, in Mr. Zeeze's opinion, held only month to month.
The trial court found that defendant Trailer Mart,
Inc., which plaintiff Zeese testified he had always believed to be a month-to-month tenant, had paid the real
property taxes on the premises as follows:
"Finding of Fact No. 21. Defendant Trailer Mart,
Inc., d / b / a Dan's Campers N ' Trailers paid all
real property taxes assessed on the property
through the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972, to
Salt Lake County in the amounts of $687.53,
$683.42, $1,686.22, and $1,622.09, respectively.
Pursuant to an order of this Court, defendant
Trailer Mart, Inc., has deposited a check in the
amount of $1,330.44 with the clerk of the court
for the real property taxes assessed for the year
1973." (R. 67)
Mr. Zeese testified that neither he nor his wife paid the
taxes, that he knew the taxes had been, but he did not
know who paid them. (R. 494)
The trial court found further that after Mr. Geldzahler's letter of May 8, 1969, stating that substantial
commitments had been and would be incurred in reliance
on the lease, and after Mrs. Siegel's letter stating that
4
The three "partners" of the non-existent partnership, Patton's Travelers, were also served.
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the option to renew was thereby exercised, plaintiffs received and cashed checks for rent payment as follows:
"Findings of Fact No. 18. Commencing on May
16, 1969, and continuing through December 15,
1972, defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a Dan's
Campers 'N Trailers, sent monthly rental checks
in the sum of $200 each to plaintiffs, all of which
were cashed by plaintiffs in the ordinary course
of business; commencing on January 5, 1973, and
continuing through June 12, 1973, defendant
Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a Patton's Travelers, sent
monthly rental checks in the sum of $200 each to
plaintiffs, all of which were cashed by plaintiff
George Zeese in the ordinary course of business.''
(R. 66-67)
The trial court also found that defendant, in reliance
on the lease, had made the following improvements on
the property:
"Findings of Fact No. 29. In reliance upon the
lease and its validity and the validity of the exercise of the option to renew, defendant Trailer
Mart, Inc., performed the following acts:
A. On or about August 6, 1969, defendant
Trailer Mart, Inc. purchased from Husky Oil Company of Delaware all of Husky Oil Company's
building, equipment, and other personal property
owned by Husky and located upon the premises.
B. In or around May and June of 1969 and
at various times thereafter, defendant Trailer Mart,
Inc., d / b / a Dan's Campers 'N Trailers and later
Patton's Travelers, purchased and caused to be
erected on the premises certain signs to advertise
and identify its business thereon.
C. Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a
Dan's Campers 'N Trailers, arranged and paid for
the grading and paving of certain portions of the
surface of the premises.
12
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D. Pursuant to plaintiff George Zeese's instruction and request, defendant Trailer Mart,
Inc. caused the property to be surveyed and erected
a fence to define a boundary thereof and to secure
it from the encroachment of an adjacent property
owner. Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc. arranged and
paid for both the survey of the property and the
fence erected/'(R. 68-69)
The trial court did not agree with Mr. Zeese's conclusion concerning the use provisions in the lease:
"Conclusion of Law No. 1. Defendant Trailer
Mart, Inc.'s use of the premises for the purpose
of camper and other recreational vehicle display
and sale does not violate the use provisions contained in the lease." (R. 69)
The trial court concluded also that Mr. Zeese could
not conceal his belief that the lease had been breached
by the use of the premises, ignore the subsequent notice
exercising the option, accept each and every rent payment
after such notice, remain silent in the face of repeated
statements that the defendants considered the lease to
be valid, stand silently by while defendants paid $4,679.26
in property taxes, watch but say nothing while defendants
improved the premises at its expense and even solicit certain improvements, and then, four years and two months
later, when at last it suited his purposes, inform the defendants that they were only month-to-month tenants
and order them off the premises within fifteen days:
"Conclusion of Law No. 6. Plaintiffs have waived
and are estopped from asserting defects, if any
there may have been, in the exercise of the option
to renew the lease.
13
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Conclusion of Law No. 7. Plaintiffs have waived
and are estopped from asserting violations, if any
there may have been, of the use covenants contained in the lease by defendant Trailer Mart, Inc."
(R.70)
The trial court concluded too that plaintiffs were
estopped from asserting and had waived any claims against
defendant Husky Oil arising from its assignment of the
lease. Any liability against Husky must, in any event,
be based on breaches by the Siegel defendants. The trial
court found that there were none. (R. 70)
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSION THAT
DEFENDANT TRAILER MART, INC.'S USE
OF THE PREMISES FOR ITS BUSINESS DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE USE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE LEASE IS CLEARLY CORRECT.
Throughout the Brief of Appellant, plaintiffs assume
there is no question but that Trailer Mart, Inc.'s business
on the premises violates use provisions in the lease. This
assumption flies in the face of the trial court's first conclusion of law:
"Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc's use of the premises for the purpose of camper and other recreational vehicle display and sale does not violate
the use provisions contained in the lease."5
5
Because both parties argued this question to the trial court (R.
589-591, 594-496), plaintiffs' consistent refusal to recognize this conclusion in their brief, which corresponds to Mr. Zeese's insistent testimony
that use covenants were violated, is difficult to explain.
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The particular use covenant in question reads as
follows:
"TO HAVE A N D T O HOLD all of the same unto
Lessee, subject to the conditions herein contained,
and for no other purpose or business than that of
the construction, installation, maintenance and operation of the necessary buildings, structures,
driveways, approaches, tanks, pumps, signs, lighting equipment, or appliances for the operating
upon said premises the business of storing, marketing and distributing petroleum products and
commodities marketed in connection therewith,
A N D for the operation of a gasoline and oil filling
service station, a truckers lodge, and restaurant,
A N D for the dealing in generally of such goods,
wares and merchandise as are customarily displayed, purchased and sold at the establishments
of the type herein referred to, OR any other lawful
business." (Ex. 3-P, page 1) (Emphasis added).
It is, of course, a generally recognized rule of construction that leases, as any other contract, are to be construed
so as to save and harmonize all the words and phrases
in them. 6 In this case, plaintiffs' assumption that defendants use of the premises violated this covenant must
ignore the phrase "any other lawful business."
Applying ordinary rules of grammar and punctuation to this covenant may, it is true, yield three slightly
different grammatical meanings from the phrase, but any
one of the three would encompass defendant's business
as among the "other lawful businesses" allowed.
The first would consider the phrase "or any other
lawful business" as coordinate with the phrase "for no
*See, e.g., Powerine Co. v. Russell's Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906,
913 (1943).
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other purpose or business than that of . . ." The covenant as a whole could then be summarized as follows:
"TO HAVE A N D TO HOLD . . . for no other
purpose or business than that of . . . [a filling
station or restaurant} . . . or any other lawful business/'
A second possibility, perhaps the most plausible, is
that the phrase "or any other lawful business" is coordinate with each phrase following the words "than that of."
The conjunctions in small capitals as the provision is
set out above at 15 make the sense of this construction
clear.
Finally, the phrase could be coordinate with the
words "establishments of this type," and the covenant
summarized as follows:
"TO HAVE A N D TO HOLD . . . for no other
purpose or business than . . . [a filling station or
restaurant} . . . and for the dealing in generally
of such goods . . . as are customarily displayed,
purchased and sold at the establishments of the
type herein referred to, or any other lawful business."
Defendants are not suggesting that this Court must
choose one of these three possible constructions, but
elaborate the grammatical possibilities to illustrate the
correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the use
of the premises for recreational vehicle display and sale
does not violate this covenant. Whatever sense is made
of the phrase "any other lawful business" in the context
of the entire sentence, its own sense, any lawful business,
remains intact. The covenant as a whole then has the
16
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meaning, in essence, that the premises are leased for the
primary purpose of a gas station operation, but for any
lawful business in any event. The phrase "for no other
purpose or business," if it is construed as having any
relationship to the "lawful business" phrase, must be
allowed the paraphrase of "for no other than a law Jul
purpose or business."
Any one of the possible constructions offered above
would, in short, save all of the words and phrases in
the covenant and would harmonize all the words and
phrases with each other. Nothing would be subtracted
from the covenant and nothing added. It would mean
exactly what it says.
The trial court's ruling with respect to the use covenant comports not only with the words of the lease itself, but also with generally accepted rules for the construction of use restrictions in leases. Cases are collected
in an Annotation, "Provision in Lease as to Purpose for
which Premises Are To Be Used, As Excluding Use for
Other Purpose," 148 A.L.R. 583 (1944), where the general rule is stated:
"Provisions which authorize the use of leased
premises for a specific purpose or which merely
give consent to a particular use of the property,
are generally regarded as permissive rather than
restrictive in nature, and therefore, in the absence
of other limiting language, the lessee is not restricted to the use specified in the lease, (cases
cited.]" 148 A.L.R. at 585-86.
In Turman v. Safeway Stores, 317 P.2d 302 (Mont. 1957),
the rule is stated as follows:
17
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"The rule is that lessee is entitled to use the premises for any lawful or valid purpose, without interference on the part of the landlord, so long
as such use is not forbidden by express provision
of the lease or by some necessarily implied construction thereof, and does not amount to waste
or destruction of the property." 317 P.2d at 306.
(emphasis supplied).
Although the use covenant under consideration in
the Turman case is not set out specifically, it is apparent
from the opinion that it comprised a particular description of a retail store without any general clause such as
"for any other lawful business." The Montana court
ruled that the defendant's subletting of a part of the
premises for garage purposes did not violate this use
restriction. Such reasoning would be even more compelling here, where the specific uses described are followed
by the generally permissive phrase "or for any other
lawful business."
The "express provision" or "limiting language" required to restrict use to specifically stated purposes are
illustrated in many cases collected in the A.L.R. annotation cited above. For example, in Northern Vac. Ry. Co.
v. Northern Reo Co., 250 N . W . 329 (N.D. 1933), the restrictive clause specified for warehouse purposes "and
no other." In Britt v. Luce, 114 S.W.2d 267 (Tex App.
1938), the use clause stated explicitly: "for filling station,
general store and living quarters and for no other purpose." N o such express provision is present in the lease
in question; in fact, the generally permissive words "any
other lawful business" are written where such specifically restrictive language would usually be found.
18
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Several cases in the A.L.R. annotation also illustrate
the restrictions arising from "necessarily implied constructions" of the lease. In Weil v. Adams, 53 App. Div. 313,
66 N.Y.S. 244 (1900), for example, the court ruled that
a provision in a lease requiring consent to changes in a
sign upon which the use of a building was announced
to the public implied necessarily that consent was required to a varying use. An interesting example of necessarily implied restrictions is found in Eggen v. Wetterhorg, 257 P.2d 970 (Ore. 1951). There the use language
provided for the erection and operation of a gasoline
filling station and the rent provisions specified that the
landlord would receive as rent, in addition to a flat
monthly sum, one-half cent for each gallon of gasoline
sold. The Oregon court determined that the erection of
a cafe and beer tavern on the premises did not violate
the use provisions, since such a restriction was not implied in the lease, but that the termination of the filling
station operation did violate use provisions, since the
landlord's rent was necessarily tied to the operation of
the station and the termination of its operations would
deprive him of a substantial portion of the consideration he had given for the lease. Plaintiffs-appellants have
nowhere argued that such necessarily implied restrictions
are present in the lease in question, and an examination
of it reveals none.
Plaintiffs properly argued to the trial court that the
lease must be construed in its entirety, Potverine Co. v.
Russell's Inc., supra. However, the other provisions that
plaintiffs indicated should be brought to bear on the use
covenant are of no value in construing it. The first of
19
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these provisions states that the lessee "may also sublet
the premises for the operation of a gasoline and oil filling station to any person or persons without the consent
of the lessor . . ." (emphasis supplied). The "also" refers to the immediately preceding sentence: "This lease
shall be assignable by the LESSEE without the consent
of the LESSOR provided that LESSEE shall at all times
be liable for the faithful performance of all covenants
of this lease. . . ." The juxtaposition of these two sentences emphasizes the absence of further use restrictions
in the assignment provisions. Accordingly, the plain
meaning of the assignment clause is that an assignee takes
the lease subject only to the restrictions contained in the
use covenant set out above. Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc.,
never argued that it held the premises as a sublessee, but
rather as an assignee.7
Plaintiffs also pointed to a paragraph on page 5 of
the lease which provides that the lessee may cancel if
certain permits and other arrangements necessary for the
erection of a filling station could not be obtained. N o
defendant has ever argued that Saturn Oil did not intend to erect and did not in fact erect a gas and oil filling station on the premises, nor that the premises were
not used for these purposes for almost ten years. The
provisions going to cancellation concern only the immediate use contemplated by the original lessee, but imply
nothing at all about the meaning of the use provisions.8
defendants did plead, in the alternative, in their counterclaim, that
they were a sublessee, but maintained consistently at trial that Trailer
Mart, Inc., possessed the premises as an assignee.
8
The drafter would have been particularly concerned that the purposes for which his client, Saturn Oil, was leasing the premises were covered and protected by the use provisions. It would be only common legal
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Both of these provisions leave only the use provision to
be construed, with no guidance as to its meaning.
Plaintiffs also argued to the trial court that the phrase
must be limited by the concept of ejusdem generis. This
argument is implausible for many reasons. Ejusdem generis is not applicable ipso facto whenever a general phrase
concludes a series of particular phrases. As was stated
in City of Lexington v. Edgerton, 159 S.W.2d 1015,
1017-18, 289 Ky. 815:
"The (ejusdem generis' and fexpressio unius est
exclusio alterius' rules are 'rules of construction',
and not 'rules of substantive law', and are not to
be applied if the intention of the act is clear."
Similar statements that the rule of ejusdem generis is to
be applied to determine the intent of the parties are to
be found in Phillips v. Houston Nat91 Bank, Tex., 108
F.2d 934, 936 (1940), and, with respect to the intent
of the legislature in constitutional and statutory construction, in Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33
Utah 14, 93 P. 53, 54(1907).
At the trial, plaintiffs offered no evidence or arguments that the intent of the parties was not contained
within the four corners of the lease itself. They had alleged in their complaint that the use covenant was negotiated for a particular purpose, but apparently later
abondoned this position. And, while Mr. Zeese made
clear his certainty that the premises should be used only
sense to elaborate these uses in some detail, leaving unspecified the other
lawful businesses for which the premises might be used, since these were
not within the realm of immediate contemplation. Cf., Annot. 2 A.L.R.2d
1150.
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for service station purposes, his behavior during defendant Trailer Mart's first four years and two months of
business on the premises indicates that he had no particular reason for insisting on such use and did not feel
himself harmed by Trailer Mart's business activities. Had
the service station operation been related to some particular interest of Mr. Zeese, he certainly would have objected immediately when the camper and recreational vehicle sales commenced and would have announced his
objections as soon as he felt himself harmed. In fact, it
was not until Mr. Zeese determined that another bargain for the use of the land would be more beneficial to
him than the bargain already struck that he announced
that the use covenant had been violated.
From this, it would strain credulity to believe that
Mr. Zeese had any particular purpose or intent when he
agreed to the use covenant in the lease. The intention
of the parties was not, therefore, before the trial court,
and the rule of ejusdem generis is not applicable.
Even if intention had been an issue, it is clear that
Mr. Zeese's course of conduct during the four years and
two months in question would have been much more probative of his understanding and intentions with respect
to the use provision than would the application of a latin
phrase to the words of the lease. Cf., Vernon v. Lake
Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302, 306 (1971);
Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 323, 266
P.2d 494 (1954). And, if there had been any real intention to express the restrictions for which the plaintiffs
argue, a more inappropriate use provision is difficult to
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imagine. The plaintiffs would have insisted on words
other than "for any other lawful purpose".
To summarize, the trial court was not faced with
the problem of determining the intent of the parties; it
was faced with the plain meaning of the lease itself and
properly considered the lease in the light of generally
accepted rules for construction of use provisions. Its conclusion that Trailer Mart does not and has not violated
the use provision was clearly correct.

POINT II
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES MAY BE INVOKED TO ESTOP A LANDLORD FROM
ASSERTING VIOLATIONS OF USE COVENANTS AS A BASIS FOR FORFEITURE, OR
TO ESTABLISH THAT A LANDLORD HAS
WAIVED ANY FORFEITURE ARISING
FROM SUCH COVENANTS.
Plaintiffs argue in Points IV and V of the Brief of
Appellants, that the trial court erred in concluding that
they are estopped from asserting and have waived violations of the use covenant in the lease. The force of this
argument is diminished when it is remembered that the
trial court had previously concluded that these was no
violation of the use covenant. The conclusion concerning waiver and estoppel was in the subjunctive — qualified by the words "if any there may have been". Plaintiffs ignore, or perhaps are unaware of, the first conclusion. They take all of their shots at the second. Even
these are wide of the mark.
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Defendants have no argument with the general rules
set out at page 48 of the Brief of Appellants as general
rules. These general rules do not, however, apply to
this case. The plaintiffs did not comply with the words
they quote from 3A Thompson on Real Property, § 1328,
at 578 (1959 Repl.), which states the common law rule:
"Yet, even after an estoppel, if the covenantee
gives notice that he intends henceforth to stand
upon his legal right, it has been held that he may
enforce the terms of the contract strictly from that
time on" (emphasis supplied).
Nor do the lease provisions before this Court comport
with the lease provisions Thompson considers in the
language quoted by plaintif s:
"Any inference of a waiver by the landlord of a
forfeiture of the lease by acceptance of the rent
with knowledge of a breach of condition or covenant is rebutted by a provision in the lease that
the receipt of rent with knowledge of any breach
shall not be deemed a waiver" (emphasis supplied).
These rules should be contrasted with the lease provision
and the plaintiffs' conduct in this case. The lease provides:
" N o waiver of any forfeiture by acceptance of rent
or otherwise shall waive any subsequent breach of
any conditions in this lease;" (emphasis supplied).
The meaning of this provision is that acceptance of rent
or other conduct may constitute a waiver of forfeiture,
but that such waiver shall not constitute a waiver of forfeiture for subsequent breaches. It is, in short, a statement of the common law rule. Thompson, on the other
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hand, considers provisions stating that acceptance of rent
will not constitute a waiver of a forfeiture based on any
breach, prior or subsequent.
If, then, for argument's sake, we join plaintiffs in
ignoring the trial court's conclusion that the use provision was not violated, plaintiffs are still in the position
of those covenantees who, after an estoppel, must give
notice that they intend henceforth to stand upon their
legal rights and strictly enforce the terms of the lease.
Mr. Zeese's conduct, which has been set forth at some
length above and which is amply supported by his own
testimony, certainly constitutes grounds for an estoppel
from asserting, or a waiver of, any forfeiture based on
breaches of the lease. The trial court so found.
Plaintiffs were in no position then to demand that
defendants vacate the premises nor to bring an action
for unlawful detainer, without first giving defendant
notice to cure the purported breach. But both the June
notice and the notice to quit were pre-emtory: defendant was ordered off the premises. Nothing was stated in
either of them that would indicate that plaintiffs intended to stand by any provision in the lease and to enforce them in the future.
There can be no question, and plaintiffs do not seriously argue, that a landlord can waive and be estopped
from asserting breaches that would otherwise give them
the right to declare forfeiture and to re-enter. See 3A
on Real Property, § 1328, at 575, 579 and 581 (1959
Repl.). In Sharp v. Twin Lakes Corp., 283 P.2d 611
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(Nev. 1955), the lessor, asserting numerous breaches including breaches "dealing largely with the manner in
which the premises were maintained and used" admitted
that the rent payments due under the lease had been accepted with knowledge of the defaults. The lessor had,
"until filing of his counterclaim, given the lessee no intimation that he regarded the lease as forfeited." The
Nevada Court ruled:
"His [the landlord's} conduct was consistent only
with an election to hold the lessee to its obligations under the lease. Clearly, he has, by acceptance of rentals under these circumstances, affirmed
the existence of the lease and recognized the lessee
as his tenant. His right to claim forfeiture has
thus been waived" (emphasis supplied). 283 P.2d
at 613.
See also, Cady v. Slingerland, 514 P.2d 1147 (Wyo. 1973);
Larsen v. Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177, 183 (Wyo. 1951); Port
of Walla Walla v. Sun-Glo Producers, Inc., 8 Wash. App.
51,504P.2d324,330(1973). 9
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE
OPTION TO RENEW, THAT ANY DEFECTS
IN THE NOTICE DID NOT PREJUDICE
PLAINTIFFS, AND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
HAVE WAIVED AND ARE ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING ANY SUCH DEFECTS.
defendant's counsel at trial reserved objections to the propriety of
plaintiffs' notices to quit. If the judgment of the trial court is vacated,
the case should be remanded for further proceedings, since defendants
never had an opportunity to present their defenses. The record is in no
condition to support the relief plaintiffs seek on this appeal.
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A. There Was No Defect in the Notice
the Option.

Exercising

In construing Utah Code Annotated § 73-3-19, this
Court has stated that the powers of an executor named
in a will are closely limited before Letters Testamentary
are issued. Estate Realty, Inc. v. Kershaw, 29 Utah 2d
92, 505 P.2d 777 (1973). The Estate Realty case involved
a plaintiff realtor's attempt to obtain judgment for a
commission on a sale of real property in an estate, which
was purportedly consummated before the executor was
issued Letters Testamentary. The Court ruled that the
sale was not in fact consummated because the executor
had no power to dispose of the property. It is significant, however, that the buyer did obtain and take possession of the property on the terms bargained for between him and the executor. Neither the buyer nor the
executor were before the Court attempting to upset the
bargain, which was, as the opinion states, later ratified
by each of the parties to the contract. Rather, the realtor,
which must in its professional capacity be charged with
some responsibility to handle real estate transactions in
a fashion that cannot be impeached by Utah statutes, did
not receive a judgment for its commission. It is not clear
from the Estate Realty case that either the seller-executor
or the buyer would have been allowed to upset the transaction, even before it was confirmed by the probate
court, if the other party had changed its position substantially in reliance on the contract.
In the Estate Realty case, this Court rejected the doc-
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trine of "relation back" 10 with respect to the sale of real
property before an executor is issued Letters Testamentary. However, § 73-3-19, Utah Code Annotated, states
specifically that an executor may "take necessary measures for the preservation of the estate". Clearly, the preservation of the lease in question was an act that was
necessary for the preservation of the estate, for without
the exercise of the option, a valuable lease might have
been lost.
In the Estate Realty case, there was apparently no
attempt to show that the sale of the property was for any
particular benefit of the estate, let alone that it was
done to preserve the estate's assets.
Mrs. Siegel was granted Letters Testamentary shortly
after the letter exercising the option to renew was written. Contrary to the implications in plaintiffs' brief, there
is nothing in the probate code requiring a petition to the
probate court for permission to exercise an option to
renew a lease.11
In any event, this may not be an appropriate case
for the determination of whether the relation back doc10
The relation back rule is stated in an Annotation in 2 A.L.R.3d
1107 (1965):
"[I]t is well settled that the grant of letters testamentary or of administration relates back to the decedent's death to validate previous
intermediate acts of one who subsequently qualifies as executor or
administrator when such acts are for the benefit of the estate as when
necessary to preserve its assets" (emphasis added).
11
Plaintiffs' brief contains scandalous material implying that the
State and Federal fiscs do not contain their proper share of Mr. Max
Siegel's estate. Aside from their standing to raise these issues, the probate
has long been closed, and the taxes assessed and paid. Moreover Max
Siegel was the agent of Trailer Mart, Inc., as the trial court found, in
receiving the assignment from Husky Oil Company.
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trine should be applied to acts by an executor without
Letters Testamentary which were meant to preserve assets
in an estate. The trial court concluded that the notice
of the exercise of the option by Mrs. Siegel did not violate any terms or conditions of the lease. It was in writing, and it was timely. Plaintiffs knew at that time that
defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a Dan's Campers N '
Trailers was in possession of the premises. They subsequently had repeated actual notice that the defendants
believed the option had been validly exercised and that
the lease was valid and enforceable. Plaintiffs accepted
monthly rent from defendant for a period of four years
and two months, allowed the defendant to pay substantial property taxes on the premises, and remained silent
as defendants improved the property.

B. The Trial Court's Conclusion That the Option
Was Exercised Would Have Been Correct Even If There
Had Been No Written Notice.
Even if there had been no written notice of an exercise of the option, the record contains ample evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion and judgment that
Trailer Mart, Inc., owns a leasehold interest pursuant
to the terms of the lease.
The rule is stated in 50 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and
Tenant, § 1190:
* 'Generally, where a lessee having a general privilege of extending the lease holds over, even without any notice of the lessor of its election to extend the lease for the further term, his holding
29
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over constitutes an election so to extend, and he
is entitled, as against the lessor, to hold for a further term."
In the same section it is indicated that holding over creates a * 'presumption of an exercise of the option" which
may be rebutted by the landlord. In this case, plaintiffs neither introduced, offered nor suggested any evidence that would constitute a rebuttal to this presumption.
It is specifically stated in 50 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord
and Tenant, § 1191, at 79, that
"If the tenant has an option to renew for a specified term, the holdover, with payment and unconditional acceptance of rent, will create a tenancy
for the specified term, such acceptance of the rent
constituting a waiver of any right of the landlord's notice of the intention of the tenant to renew."
Cases from neighboring jurisdictions are in agreement with this rule. For example, in Drace v. Hyde, 497
P.2d 420 (Okla. 1972), it was held that where a lessee,
by serving written notice could renew its lease for another five year term with an increment in rent from $280
per month to $300 per month, and the lessee never gave
any written notice that the option to renew was exercised, but did on the landlord's demand increase the rent
payments to $300 per month and paid the increased rents
for a period of 31 months after the expiration of the first
term, the lease was thereby renewed for the entire five
year term. In another Oklahoma case, Standard Parts
Co. v. D & J Invest. Co., 288 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1955), the
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Court quoted with approval the following language from
51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 77 at 628:
1

'Where a lease provides that a tenant may at
his option have an extension for a specified time
after the expiration of the term of the lease . . .
the mere holding over after the expiration of the
specified time is generally held to constitute an
election to hold for the additional or extended
term, particularly where coupled with the payment and acceptance, or tender, of the rent fixed
in the option.''
The Court then ruled that because the defendant tenant
had made valuable improvements on the property and
had held over under the terms of the lease, the option
was deemed to be exercised without any specific acts exercising it12 And in Cafe Apollo Co. v. Anselm, 111 P.2d
691 (Cal. App. 1941), the court, after determining that
the sublessee defendant in fact had an option to renew,
stated:
"It is admitted that appellant remained in possession and paid the stipulated rental of $275 per
month for nearly two years after the expiration
of her sublease. Such payment of rental and its
acceptance by respondent constituted an exercise
of such option by appellant. As a result, the trial
court's finding to the effect that appellant, ever
since April 1, 1936, has used and occupied, and
does now use and occupy said floor space, 'as such
month-to-month tenant', is not supported by the
evidence." 117 P.2d at 695-94.
12
The lease in the Standard Parts case did not contain explicit provisions as to how or when the option would be exercised.
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In this case, defendants held over for a period of
four years and two months without once receiving any
intimation from plaintiffs that the option to renew the
lease had not been validly exercised. Not only did they
pay the rents and the property taxes and improve the
premises, but they also gave plaintiffs actual and explicit notice that they considered the lease to be valid
and enforceable. The trial court's conclusions and judgment comported with the well established rule that by
holding over and continuing to perform all of the obligations of the lease, an option for an additional term
is thereby exercised. Even if plaintiffs had received no
written notice of any sort of an exercise of the option to
renew, they would still be without grounds to claim that
the lease was not renewed for the additional term.
C. Plaintiffs Waived and Were Estopped from
serting Defects in the Notice.

As-

But, of course, plaintiffs did receive a written notice
that conformed in all respects with the requirements
stated in the lease. It is well established that in circumstances such as those in this case, the landlord waives
and is estopped from asserting any defects in the notice.
In Jensen v. O.K. Invest. Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507
P.2d 713 (1973), where the landlord had accepted rents
and remained silent in the face of written notification
that an option to renew was being exercised by the assignee, this Court ruled that such conduct by the landlord
". . . constituted a waiver of [the landlord's} right
to demand a forfeiture for breach of the condition
against assignment without written consent." 507
P.2dat717
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Conduct that would compel a finding of waiver of an
affirmative act, such as giving a written consent to an
assignment, would be even more compelling as a waiver
of defects in the act of another, such as giving notice that
an option to renew was being exercised.
Many courts have held that a landlord may waive
and be estopped from asserting strict compliance with
the conditions stated in a lease by which an option to
renew shall be exercised. In Flint v. Mincoff, 353 P.2d
340 (Mont. I960), the Court, quoting 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 62 (d), stated:
"The provisions of the lease requiring notice from
the lessee of an election or intention to renew or
extend the term are for the benefit of the lessor,
and therefore the notice itself or any other matter
going to the sufficiency thereof may be waived.
The requirements of written notice may be waived
by parol and a waiver of notice may be expressed
or may be inferred from the conduct of the parties."
(emphasis added)
In the Flint case, the lessee had wired his landlord $1,000
for the payment of the next year's rent without any written notice that the lease was to be renewed for the additional years as required by the lease agreement. The jury
found that, as alleged by the tenant, the landlord had
been orally notified of the tenant's intention to renew and
accepted such notification without objection, thereby waiving his right to require strict compliance with the notice
conditions specified in the lease.
Similarly, in Pouquette v. Double L-W Ranch, Inc.,
464 P.2d 350 (Ariz. App. 1970), the tenant had given notice
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two weeks prior to the time called for in the lease, which
could properly have been given at any time within the
next two months. The landlord continued to accept the
rents and made no objection to the purported exercise of
the option until his action was commenced. The trial
court found that the landlord was not prejudiced by the
premature notice. Under these circumstances, the appellate court held that the landlord had waived his right to
insist on compliance with the terms for renewal contained
in the lease. See also, Wherry v. Lacey, 388 P.2d 279 (Ore.
1964). In the case at bar, plaintiffs are not prejudiced
to them from the manner in which the option to renew
the lease was exercised. In fact, Mr. Zeese stated explicitly that it suited his purposes very well to have defendant on the premises for a period of four years and two
months.
T o summarize, in the case at hand, actual notice was
given that the option to renew the lease for an additional
term was being exercised. The uncontroverted facts establish that the plaintiffs made no objection at all to this
notice at any time and, in fact, the plaintiffs assumed that
the notice was immaterial because the lease agreement
itself had already been terminated by defendant's use of
the premises. Plaintiffs continued to accept the rents as
provided in the lease agreement for a period of four years
and two months without once indicating to defendant
that they considered the option to renew had not been
exercised. Plaintiffs could have been prejudiced by the
exercise of the option by Mrs. Eva Siegel rather than
Trailer Mart, Inc., and plaintiffs' actions in remaining
silent and failing to object to the exercise, accepting the
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rents, accepting defendant's payment of the taxes, all show
that they did not consider themselves prejudiced. As in
the cases cited above, through their silence and failure
to object and continued acceptance of rents (all of which
in this case continued for a much longer period than in
any other case defendants can discover) plaintiffs have
waived any right to object to the sufficiency of notice.
The trial court's conclusions and judgment are supported both by well established rules of waiver and estoppel, and the rule that a tenant holding over and complying with all of the terms of the lease shall be considered
to have exercised the option to renew for an additional
term, even though there were defects in compliance with,
or a complete failure to comply with, the conditions in
the lease for exercising such an option.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT THAT
TRAILER MART, INC., OWNS A VALID
AND SUBSISTING LEASEHOLD INTEREST
IN THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE
TERMS OF THE LEASE IS CLEARLY CORRECT.
In the Brief of Appellants, plaintiffs labor strenuously to establish that the trial court erred in its conclusion and judgment that Trailer Mart, Inc., owns a leasehold interest in the premises pursuant to the terms of
the lease. However, this conclusion and judgment is amply
supported in the record and by the law.
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A. The Trial Court Properly Found That an Assignment From Max Siegel to Trailer Mart, Inc., Had
Been Established by the Corporation's Use and Possession
of the Premises.
In Jensen v. O.K. Invest. Corp., supra, this Court
stated:
* 'There is a presumption that a lease has been assigned, when there is a person other than the lessee in possession of the leased premises, who is
paying rent to the lessor." 507 P.2d at 716.
The Court cited Abbott v. Bob's U-Drive, 222 Ore.
127, 352 P.2d 598, 81 A.L.R.2d 793 (I960), where the
Oregon Court stated:
"When a person other than the lessee is in possession of leased premises paying rent to the lessor, there is a presumption that the lease has been
assigned to the person in possession, [citations}
In a majority of the modern cases applying this
rule, the implied assignment arising out of possession is regarded as effective to form the basis
for the running of covenants in the lease so as to
burden or benefit the assignee." 352 P.2d at 602.
Disapproving of a prior Oregon case, Leadbetter v. Pewtherer, 61 Ore. 168, 121 P. 799 (1912), which stated that
assignment by occupancy "cannot amount to or be shown
to establish a formal assignment, for the purpose of binding defendant by the covenants of the lease", the Abbott
opinion continued:
"The Court, in the Leadbetter case, held that the
possessor was liable for the rent covenanted to be
paid in the written lease. Apparently, the recovery
was deemed to be for use and occupation rather
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than for the breach of a covenant running with
the land. We believe, however, that the cases
holding that the implied assignment carries with
it liability on the covenants which run with the
land state the better rule, and we adopt it. . . . If
the possessor's interest is regarded as arising out
of an implied assignment, // seems only consistent
to treat him as standing in the same position as
an assignee who occupies the premises under a
written assignment. The occupation of the premises and the payment of rent should be sufficient
to take the case out of the statute of frauds." 352
P.2d at 602-03 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court also cited 3A Thompson on Real Property,
§ 1208 (1959 Repl.), where the rule of assignment by occupancy is stated as follows:
' 'Where a person other than the lessee is found
in possession of the leased premises, having succeeded to the lessee's enjoyment and occupation,
without the prior knowledge of the landlord, such
person is presumed to hold, by virtue of an assignment from the lessee {footnote, citing cases}.
Where lessee occupies the leased premises during
the continuation of the term and pays rent, he is
prima facie an assignee of the term."
At page 46 of the same section, Thompson explains
how the presumption of assignment by occupancy may be
rebutted:
"The presumption of a valid lease may be rebutted by showing that the occupant of the premises held as an undertenant without even a bare
knowledge of the original lease. . . . The presumption of an assignment can also be overthrown by
showing that the occupant never told the lessors
that he was holding under the lease."
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The uncontroverted facts in this case meet every element of the presumption of assignment by occupancy.
Trailer Mart, Inc., was in possession, and the plaintiffs
knew it was in possession. It paid the rent directly to
them for a period of four years and two months. Plaintiffs completely failed, and indeed did not even attempt
to rebut the presumption of assignment by occupancy.
It is clear in the record that Trailer Mart, Inc., had full
knowledge of the original lease and told the plaintiffslessors that it was holding under the lease. It is not
really necessary, then, to follow plaintiffs' tortuous arguments that Max Siegel was not an agent of Trailer
Mart, Inc., and that various other errors compel the reversal of the trial court's judgment that Trailer Mart,
Inc., owns the leasehold interest. It acquired the interest
by an assignment through occupancy. Nevertheless, the
Court's attention is invited to the other infirmities in
plaintiffs' arguments that the lease never reached Trailer
Mart, Inc.

B. The Trial Court's Conclusion That Max Siegel
Acted as an Agent of Trailer Mart, Inc., Was Clearly Correct.
Plaintiffs attack Max Siegel's status as an agent of
Trailer Mart, Inc., on several grounds. First, they contend at pages 15 through 17 of their brief that the assignment from defendant Husky Oil Company (Exhibit 6-P)
indicates clearly on its face that it was made to Max Siegel
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as an individual. In the Jensen case,13 supra, this Court
quoted the following language with approval:
"The contract of the agent is the contract of the
principal, and he may sue or be sued thereon,
though not named therein, and notwithstanding
the rule of law that an agreement reduced to writing may not be contradicted or varied by parol.
It is well settled that the principal may show that
the agent who made the contract in his own name
was acting for him. This proof does not contradict the writing; it only explains the transaction."
The Court also quoted with approval the statement that
the foregoing "declares the universal law". Sumner v.
Flowers, 130 Cal. App. 2d 672, 279 P.2d 772, 774 (1955).
In view of this rule and Mr. Zeese's knowledge obtained
immediately after the assignment that Trailer Mart, Inc.,
was occupying the premises, the words on the face of
the assignment itself do not establish that Max Siegel was
not acting as an agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. The fact
that he was is well established in the record at 544
through 548, where it is explained that it was always
Max Siegel's intention as president of Trailer Mart, Inc.,
to obtain the premises in question for the expansion of
the corporation's business onto it, and that he negotiated
the assignment for this purpose (R. 544-548). A cursory
reading of Dan Siegel's testimony contained in these
pages will demonstrate the distortions contained at page
17 of the Brief of Appellants.
13
The circumstances of the assignment in this case are indistinguishable from the circumstances in Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp., 29 Utah
2d 231, 507 P.2d 713, 715-16 (1973). Here, as there, the assignment was
made to the agent whose agency was not disclosed on the face of the
document.
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Plaintiffs next attack the agency relationship under
the Utah statute of fraud and attempt to distinguish the
rule stated in Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 52, 261
P.2d 952 (1953), that "when the person who acts under
oral authorization is either a general agent or executive
officer of the corporation", there is an exception to the
general rule of the statute of frauds that the agent's
power to enter the particular transaction must be authorized in writing. In the Mathis opinion, this Court cited
with approval the following language from Jeppi v.
Brockman Holding Co., 34 Cal.2d 11, 206 P.2d 847, 850,
9 A.L.R.2d 1297:
"In the case of an executive officer of a corporation an exception from the requirement of written authority finds at least plausible support and
reason in that, as said in the McCartney case, 'the
executive officer of a corporation is something
more than an agent. He is a representative of the
corporation itself.' * * * This reasoning squares
with sound principles and the necessities of modern business." 206 P.2d at 850.
The Mathis opinion continued:
"Kingston [the agent} not only acted as Trustee
for the cooperative interest in the property, but he
also held the positions of general manager and
president. Moreover, the scope of authority authorized and performed was that of a general agent.
The exception to the language in statute of frauds
is clearly applicable here."
In the instant case, the question of whether Trailer Mart,
Inc.'s corporate minute book was in order was never
raised at the trial. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it must be assumed that it was, and that Max
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Siegel was duly authorized to act as President by a written resolution of the board. Therefore, since he did have
the powers of a corporate president and the consequent
powers of a general agent, this exception to the statute
of frauds would be applicable just as it was in the Mathts
case.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Mathts case by
reading it to say that the agent there in question was
"orally" given the requisite authority and that this "oral"
authorization was evidenced by the minutes of a corporate meeting. Such corporate proceedings would be
very odd. In fact, the Mathts opinion makes clear that
it was the agent's general position as trustee that was
evidenced by the corporate minutes. 14
Finally, plaintiffs would have defendant bound by
its pleadings in the alternative on its counterclaim that
are set forth at pages 21 and 22 of plaintiffs' brief and
by certain quotations from an opening statement and a
colloquy between the Court and defendant's counsel. It
can only be said that pleadings in the alternative do not
bind a party to the position pled, otherwise the rule allowing such pleadings would be reduced to an absurdity.
Defendants reassert the correctness of the argument in
the opening statement and the colloquy. The lease was
assigned; it was assigned by defendant Trailer Mart, Inc.'s
occupancy of the premises. In addition, and for the second of the two theories that defendants' counsel asserted,
14
For a discussion of the policy and cases supporting the rule that an
assignment by occupancy does not violate the statute of frauds see
Abbott v. Bob's U-Drive, supra, 352 P.2d at 603.
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Mr. Max Siegel was acting as an agent of Trailer Mart,
Inc., when the assignment was received. Both theories
are supported by the record and by the law, and both
theories are sufficient to support the trial court's judgment that the leasehold interest is owned by Trailer Mart,
Inc.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED ALL CLAIMS A N D CAUSES OF ACT I O N AGAINST DEFENDANT HUSKY OIL
COMPANY.
Husky Oil Company of Delaware is a defendant in
this case because it assigned the lease. Plaintiffs claim
no defects or failure to comply with the conditions of
the lease in this assignment, and the record establishes
that plaintiffs received prompt notice of it.
Plaintiffs' attack on the trial court's judgment with
respect to Husky Oil Company is again based upon a
fundamental misapprehension of what the trial court
found and concluded. In addition to concluding that
plaintiffs had waived and were estopped from asserting
any causes of action against Husky Oil, the trial court
made another dispositive general conclusion: that plaintiffs had failed to show any liability on the part of the
Siegel defendants. Once again, contrary to plaintiffs'
statement in Point VI of their brief, the district court did
not find that Trailer Mart, Inc., "breached the restrictive
use covenants contained in the lease". Its conclusion was
directly opposite. Accordingly, by plaintiffs' own theory
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of the case, since they failed to show any liability on the
part of Trailer Mart, they have failed to establish any
liability against defendant Husky Oil Company.
But even if the Court decides that the trial court's
conclusions with respect to Trailer Mart were erroneous,
plaintiffs' claims against defendant Husky Oil Company
must be dismissed as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs would have the best of all possible legal
arguments. On the one hand, they claim that the Siegel
defendants immediately breached use covenants contained
in the lease and failed to properly exercise an option to
renew its term, thereby becoming month-to-month tenants, subject to eviction on 15 days notice. For these defendants, plaintiffs argue, the lease was a nullity almost
from the date of its assignment, and they have no rights
under its terms and provisions, but were allowed to stay
on the premises for four years and two months as monthto-month tenants. On the other hand, plaintiffs argue
that with respect to defendant Husky Oil Company, the
lease remained in full force and effect for a period of
four years and two months, even though the option to
renew was never properly exercised, the original term
had expired four years previously, and the use covenants
were violated.
Plaintiffs never explain how, if the lease lapsed as
asserted in their letter of June 15, 1973, and defendant
Trailer Mart, Inc., was allowed to remain on the premises only as a month-to-month tenant, its terms could remain valid and enforceable with respect to defendant
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Husky Oil Company. The proposition is so unusual that
it is difficult to find legal concepts to bring to bear on it.
Plaintiffs point to the Siegel defendants and say, "Your
contractual rights and obligations under the lease are at
an end, and our relationship will henceforth be that of
a landlord to a month-to-month tenant." They then point
to Husky Oil and say, "You are duty-bound to see that
the Siegel defendants fully and faithfully comply with the
obligations of the lease."
Plaintiffs suggest that the words of Rule 8(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bar the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs had waived and are estopped from
asserting any defects in the assignment from Husky Oil
to Trailer Mart, Inc. This rule is not as stringent as
plaintiffs would have it. In Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah
2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, this Court allowed the introduction
of a subsequent agreement, even though it had not been
pled as an affirmative defense, when the plaintiffs did
not make any representations to the Court that they were
surprised or prejudiced by its introduction. Clearly in
this case plaintiffs were on notice that waiver and estoppel would be an issue before the trial court since it was
pled and argued at length in the pretrial proceedings by
the Siegel defendants. At trial plaintiffs made no attempt
that is apparent in the record to rebut these defenses.
Moreover, since the conclusion of waiver and estoppel
with respect to the Husky Oil assignment was premised
completely on the relationship between plaintiffs and the
Siegel defendants, Husky Oil could not be apprised of
the underlying facts until the proceedings were well beyond the original and amended complaint and answers.
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It would have been superfluous and redundant to compel Husky Oil to amend its answer to include these defenses when it was clear that the matter would be fully
determined by the ruling on the Siegel defendants' defenses. Cf., Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d
884(1955).
Even if plaintiffs abandoned their anomalous position that the lease had lapsed with respect to the Siegel
defendants but not with respect to Husky Oil Company,
Husky would still not be liable for any breaches on the
part of Trailer Mart, Inc. It must be remembered that
Husky was itself an assignee, not the original lessee specified in the paragraph in the lease upon which plaintiffs
rely. As is said in Walbergh v. Moudy, 329 P.2d 377,
381 (Cal.App. 1958):
"The assignment of a lease creates a privity of
estate from the original lessor and the assignee
on the acceptance by the latter of the assignment.
N o contractual relation comes into existence between them by the mere force of the assignment. . . . In the absence of a new contractual
stipulation, there is no privity of contract between
the assignee and the lessor. An assignee who holds
the demised property merely by virtue of an assignment of the lease, without any contractual relation with the lessor to fulfill the covenants of
the lease, is bound only for obligations arising
from actual possession or privity of estate as distinguished from privity of contract."
In the instant case, since the plaintiffs offered no evidence of any contractual relationship between themselves
and Husky Oil Company, it is clear that Husky's rights
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and duties pursuant to the lease arose from its possession
or privity of estate and were immediately terminated
when it relinquished possession. See also, Bornel, Inc. v.
City Products Corp., 432 P.2d 489 (Wyo. 1967); Cf.
49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 439 at 443:
"[I}f the lessee parts with his estate by assigning
the lease to another . . . the privity of the estate
is thereby destroyed and he has no further obligation to pay rent."
In short, plaintiffs' claims against defendant Husky
Oil Company of Delaware are completely untenable and
should be dismissed as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The rulings and judgment of the trial court were correct in all respects and should be affirmed for the reasons
hereinabove set forth.
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